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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to explore the motives of the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf 
region vis-a-vis the energy resources of the region. Studying geopolitical codes helps reveal 
the intentions behind a state’s foreign policy through defining national interests, threats, 
actions and justification. Examining the U.S. code suggests the importance of oil as a vital 
strategic interest for the country. It defines the preservation of the U.S. hegemonic position 
as an ultimate goal for its presence in the Persian Gulf. In this respect, the threat of Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraqi government to three vast fields of energy reservoirs in the Persian Gulf 
made it necessary to affect regime change so as to protect the free flow of oil to the West 
and this was done through the control and preservation of the U.S. hegemonic position. 
Keywords: U.S. geopolitical code, Persian Gulf’s energy resources, the Bush Administration, pre-emptive 
war, U.S. hegemonic position
INTRODUCTION
The Persian Gulf region has always been 
considered a strategic area among powerful 
countries since the earlier centuries because 
of its geostrategic location and especially 
its energy resources. It became particularly 
important during the First World War when 
Britain shifted the fuel source of its Royal 
Navy ships from coal to oil (Yergin, 2006). 
This region has also been significant to 
the United States of America since before 
the Second World War, and especially so 
after Britain’s withdrawal from the region 
in 1971 when the U.S. military presence in 
the region was reinforced. This was evident 
in the U.S. leader’s statements, in particular 
after the Oil Crisis in 1973, which explicitly 
signify the importance of this region to 
America’s vital interests. In the country’s 
military response against any aggression in 
this area, the following except asserts one 
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of the most notable statements made by 
President Carter in 1980; 
“Let our position be absolutely 
clear: An attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an 
assault on the vital interests of the 
United States of America, and such 
an assault will be repelled by any 
means necessary, including military 
force.”
Basically, due to its position as 
America’s vital interest, this area became 
the prominent geopolitical assumption 
during the Cold War era and had been linked 
to the U.S. geopolitical code, which was 
generally referred to as the Containment 
Policy. It therefore played an important role 
as a major factor in the U.S., who pursued 
different policies against the Soviet Union 
expansionism. It was directly related to 
the existence of vast amounts of oil and 
gas in this area, and of the dependence of 
the U.S. and its allies on these resources. 
According to Levy (1980), the Persian Gulf 
supplied over 30 per cent of America’s oil 
imports, 60 per cent of Western Europe’s 
needs and more than 70 per cent of Japan’s 
demands. In this respect, the main defined 
threat was Soviet expansionism towards the 
West’s geostrategic realm and its interests. 
To prevent a growing Soviet influence in 
this area and to protect America’s vital 
interests, especially in the free flow of oil 
to the West, different policies, such as the 
‘Twin Pillars’, were projected towards the 
Persian Gulf. More interestingly, concurrent 
with the end of the Cold War era and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United 
States increasingly attempted to redefine 
its geopolitical code and keep its high 
position in the new geopolitical order. The 
military attack against Iraq was carried 
out by an international coalition led by 
the United States in 1991. Bush Senior 
(1991) had explicitly referred to protecting 
oil fields in the Persian Gulf as one of the 
war objectives. The U.S. decision makers 
continued to pay to this area until the 
outbreak of the September 11 attacks against 
the U.S. symbols, which consequently 
caused a change in America’s geopolitical 
code and ultimately encouraged the U.S. 
government to fire up a pre-emptive war 
against Iraq in 2003. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The review of related literature shows that 
growing industrialization and consequently 
increasing demands cause the necessity 
to control raw materials across the world. 
These needs and dependence of great 
powers such as the United States on oil and 
the large reservoir of oil in the Persian Gulf 
area were the main reasons for tensions, 
conflicts and competitions. From this view, 
after the Cold War, securing access to oil as a 
vital resource had become a major theme in 
the U.S. security planning and this justified 
the use of force (Clark, 2004; Klare, 2001; 
Le Billon, 2004; Peters, 2004; Singh, 2007).
After the Cold War, with increasing 
demands for oil and replacing economic 
rivalries instead of ideological competitions, 
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great powers such as Russia, the European 
powers, China, Japan and even India came 
to the region to compete with the United 
States to access oil reservoirs. In this 
respect, the stability of supplies became 
the main concern among the world powers 
(Amirahmadi, 1996; Klare, 2001; Sen & 
Babali, 2007). For this reason, the control of 
oil was considered as “the centre of gravity 
of U.S. economic hegemony” (Bromley, 
2006), where the U.S. presence in the 
Persian Gulf was interpreted as gaining 
effective rule over the global economy for 
the next 50 years, which would be achieved 
by controlling “the global oil spigot” 
(Harvey, 2003, p. 24).
With reference to the Iraq Wars, 
however, some believe that the second Iraq 
War in 2003 was a continuation of the first 
Iraq War in 1991 (Krauthammer, 2005). 
Another view, on the other hand, sees the 
Iraq War as a normal extension of the Carter 
Doctrine, which posited the vital importance 
of the Persian Gulf to America (Klare, 2006). 
There is also a notion that Saddam Hussain 
was a serious threat to the U.S. friendly 
states as well as to the continued flow of 
large amounts of the world’s oil (Klare, 
2004b). In addition, this notion also asserts 
that “no real improvement in either the 
security environment or regional production 
levels would be possible so long as Saddam 
remained in power” (Klare, 2004a, p. 94). 
Conversely, Clark (2004) views the United 
States military operation against Iraq in 
relation to petrodollar recycling, whereas 
Russell (2005) relates it to the stability of 
oil price. Meanwhile, other scholars such 
as (Renner, 2003; Singh, 2007) refer to 
the military operation as the reduction of 
OPEC and Saudi Arabia dominance over 
the international oil market.
Another view refers to the oil reserves 
as an important element in the U.S. grand 
strategy, which believes that Iraq’s oil 
reservoir was even bigger than Saudi’s. 
Thus, , Iraq became a significant objective 
for Cheney and Bush (Iseri, 2009). This view 
emphasizes Iraq’s oil as the main reason for 
the U.S.’s attack on Iraq and it compares 
Iraq with North Korea, in the sense that 
both had been suspected of proliferating 
weapons of mass destruction, but only 
Iraq was selected for pre-emptive action 
(Le Billon, 2004). In this respect, Mercille 
(2010) stresses that “the main reason for 
intervention is control over world supply 
and not American consumption” and the 
United States “will seek to control the region 
containing two-thirds of energy resources in 
order to exert leverage over industrial rivals 
and regulate the smooth functioning of the 
world economy” (Mercille, 2010, p.6). 
Hence, this paper analyses the U.S. 
geopolitical code and attempts to explore 
the motives of the U.S. military presence 
in this region in relation to the Persian Gulf 
oil. In addition, this study also attempts to 
answer this question, “How did the United 
States geopolitical code justify the role of 
the Persian Gulf oil in the U.S. military 
intervention in 2003 after the September 11 
attacks?” Therefore, to obtain the answer, 
the U.S. geopolitical code will be examined 
and analyzed. In fact, what could distinguish 
this study from other similar works, is the 
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use of the United States geopolitical code to 
explain the relationship between the Persian 
Gulf energy reserves and the U.S. military 
presence in this area.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study perceives that the great world 
powers are always looking for opportunities 
to obtain more power for more security 
purposes . Needless to say, from an offensive 
realist theoretical perspective, this study 
also assumes that due to natural tendency, 
great powers always attempt to maximize 
their supremacy and gain a hegemonic 
position in international order, which has 
been determined as the ultimate objective 
of a conquest. In this respect and under 
the banner of offensive realism, John 
Mearsheimer has been a well-known 
participant who offers his theory in his work 
titled, ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ 
(Elman, 2004; Iseri, 2009; Snyder, 2002). 
The theory clearly provides persuasive 
answers to the aggressive strategies of 
great powers so that such strategies are 
considered as “a rational answer to life in the 
international system” (Toft, 2005, p. 381). 
This theoretical approach, basically, 
relies on five main assumptions. First, it 
is assumed that the international system is 
anarchic and there is no dominant central 
power to carry out rules effectively and 
discipline perpetrators. It does not mean that 
the system is chaotic, but the international 
system includes independent states, and 
thus, none of them has any central authority 
above them. In this respect, “sovereignty, 
in other worlds, inheres in states because 
there is no higher ruling in the international 
system. There is no government over 
government” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 
30). Second, the assumption stresses that 
great powers have always possessed some 
offensive military capacities which enables 
them to hurt or destroy each other. From this 
point of view, countries are dangerous to 
each other, and thus, those states which have 
stronger military power are more dangerous 
than others. Third, the assumption states 
that no country can ever be sure about the 
other countries’ intentions. Indeed, “no state 
can be sure that another state will not use 
its offensive military capability to attack 
the first state.”(source ?) Nevertheless, it 
does not mean that every state has hostile 
intentions, “but it is impossible to be sure 
of that judgment because intentions are 
impossible to divine with 100 percent 
certainty.” In fact, there are many causes for 
aggression, and every state can be motivated 
by one of them to attack the other state. What 
is important here is that, “intentions can 
change quickly,” and from this viewpoint, 
one friendly state today can be turn to be 
hostile tomorrow. Therefore, “states can 
never be sure that other states do not have 
offensive intentions to go along with their 
offensive capabilities”(Mearsheimer, 2001, 
p. 31). 
The fourth assumption emphasizes 
that survival is sought by all states. It is, 
specifically, “the primary goal of great 
powers.” Indeed, maintaining territorial 
integrity together and preserving autonomy 
of domestic political order are significant 
goals sought by any states. As indicated by 
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Mearsheimer “Survival dominates other 
motives because, once a state is conquered, 
it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue 
other aims.” (Mearsheimer, 2001) For this 
reason, security is the most important goal 
which is pursued by any states. Finally, the 
fifth assumption posits that great powers 
in this theory are regarded as rational 
entities that are conscious of their external 
environment. Mearsheimer (2001) reinstates 
this point by the following statement where 
he mentions, “They think strategically about 
how to survive in it.” Such states are able 
to evaluate other states’ behaviors through 
considering their preferences and influence 
of their own behavior over the behavior 
of other states. They also consider the 
influence of other states’ behavior on “their 
own strategy for survival” (Mearsheimer, 
2001, p. 31). 
More importantly, and more related to 
this paper, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism 
theory claims that states in the international 
system are seeking their survival guarantee 
in confront of other states as potential 
threats. In this view, states are not able to 
rely on other states for their own security, 
and as noted by Mearsheimer (2001), “in 
international politics, God helps those 
who help themselves” (p. 33). In this 
respect, states make a special attempt to 
increase their share of power in the world. 
This tendency to maximize their power 
continues through looking for opportunities 
to attain more power, and they only quit 
the pursuit for power once a hegemony 
position is achieved. Therefore, according 
to this theory, the best way for great powers 
to ensure their security “is to achieve 
hegemony now,” and thus, any possibility 
to form a challenge by any other great 
powers should be eliminated (Mearsheimer, 
2001, p. 35). “A hegemon is a state that is 
so powerful that it dominates all the other 
states in the system. No other state has the 
military wherewithal to put up a serious 
fight against it. In essence, a hegemon is the 
only great power in the system.” From this 
perspective, there are conceptually “global 
hegemons, which dominate the world, and 
regional hegemons, which dominate distinct 
geographical areas” (Mearsheimer, 2001, 
p. 40).
This position offered by the offensive 
realism theory could be linked to the view 
that, with the end of the Cold War, the 
United States, as the sole superpower as 
well as the most powerful state, has always 
attempted to preserve and promote its 
hegemonic position in the new geopolitical 
world order. This attempt, particularly after 
the September 11 attacks, led to militaristic 
behavior compatible with offensive realist 
reasoning that appeared in the Afghanistan 
and Iraq wars. Obviously, these geopolitical 
practices and aggressive behavior were the 
results of redefining the U.S. geopolitical 
code known as the so-called ‘War on 
Terrorism’ (Flint, 2006).
This work relies on examining the 
United States geopolitical code because the 
foreign policy of every state is the output 
of those geopolitical assumptions that are 
behind its geopolitical code (Flint & Taylor, 
2007). Such a code, indeed, “will have to 
incorporate a definition of a state’s interests, 
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an identification of external threats to those 
interests, a planned response to such threats 
and a justification for that response” (Taylor 
& Flint, 2000, p. 62). Therefore, analyzing 
the United States geopolitical code for a 
specific period of time helps understand 
America’s interests in the Persian Gulf 
region, the threats to these interests, and 
the military intervention as a response to 
those threats. With reference to the offensive 
realist approach, it obviously indicates that 
all attempts and practices of the United 
States as a great power, such as the Iraq 
War, are interpretable in order to respond 
to a threat and prevent the emergence of a 
regional hegemonic power as well as the 
continuation of its presence in that region 
to preserve and promote its hegemonic 
position in the post-Cold War era.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
On the whole, it has been emphasized that 
qualitative research is researcher centric. 
In this approach, the researcher determines 
the importance, value and originality of the 
materials. The researcher also decides on 
the documents and selects a sample of text 
for the analysis (Burnham, Lutz, Grand, 
& Layton-Henry, 2008). In this work, the 
content analysis is used due to the nature 
of research and its related information. 
Content analysis has also been introduced 
as an appropriate method to study Political 
Science and its branches of this discipline 
(Babbie, 2007). This method takes place 
every time somebody reads or listens, 
summarizes and then interprets a content 
of body (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 259). To 
analyze related data, this work applies a form 
of qualitative content analysis, which can be 
used to analyze documents of a qualitative 
study (Merriam,1989). It is important to 
note that, although documents are generally 
used as supplemental information, there is 
a view that states, “qualitative researchers 
are turning to documents as their primary 
sources of data” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998, p. 
57). The usage of documentary material has 
been regarded in part similar to interviews 
or observations. From this view, there 
are various voices that have surrounded a 
researcher in the library, and these voices 
are represented as books, articles and so on 
(Merriam, 1989). 
Public or archival documents have been 
used for analyzing the data in this work, 
which are adopted from official sources of 
the United States such as the White House 
web site. The documents deal with written 
evidence termed as ‘published evidence’ 
(Gillham, 2000). Here, the recorded official 
speeches of the U.S. president, George W. 
Bush, and some of his cabinet members in 
his first term, such as the Vice President 
(name), Secretary of State (name) , and 
Secretary of Defense (name) , were used as 
the main data for the analysis. The speeches 
also comprise some official reports which 
are related to the period between 2001 and 
2004. These documents include the National 
Energy Policy (NEP) report that indicates 
the United States strategy about energy, 
and National Security Strategy (NSS) that 
presents the annual exercise which updates 
the U.S. geopolitical code (Flint,(2006). 
These types of documents are categorized as 
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primary sources in this study (Ary, Jacobs, 
Razavieh, & Sorensen, 2006). Besides, 
secondary data are also included in the 
research data. Therefore, the presidential 
speeches and other official documents 
prepared by or under the supervision of 
the President are regarded as primary 
resources. These documents form the the 
main foundation of data in this paper.
With regard to the collection of speeches 
as the main documents for this study, it 
should be noted that the geopolitical codes 
of a state are strongly linked to presidential 
speeches. These speeches reflect those 
beliefs and geopolitical assumptions that 
construct the foundation of geopolitical 
codes. These assumptions, in fact, define 
national interests, threats and responses, 
as well as adequate justifications of the 
state. The foreign policy also relies on 
these geopolitical assumptions, and thus, 
they are seen as a close relation between 
the President and the events. In the United 
States, however, this relation is more notable 
because the President is the ‘Commander 
in Chief’. Internationally, the President is 
a subject who has a particular world view 
and agenda. The President interprets events 
and characterizes them for specific political 
goals (Flint, Adduci, Chen, & Chi, 2009). 
This paper also focuses on the State of the 
Union address, which is “an annual act of 
political theatre that demands the President 
claim that the U.S. is ‘strong’ or ‘healthy’.” 
It is a geopolitical act that “places the 
President at the center of the foreign policy 
agenda”. Apparently, this type of speech 
represents a global benevolent picture from 
the United States. This geopolitical act is 
also applied to express representations in 
order to justify America’s actions (Flint et 
al., 2009, p. 605). 
To obtain the main objective of this 
study, secondary sources are also used for 
the source of information (McNabb, 2005). 
These sources, such as relevant books and 
articles, comprise previous works which 
have been studied by other researchers 
and serve as supplementary documents 
(Merriam, 1989). Finally, through coding 
all the data and defining specific themes, the 
process of analyzing the data in this work is 
done based on the content analysis method.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In responding to the main question of 
this study, the analysis on the content of 
selected data, such as speeches, official 
documents, and previous studies, has led 
to a focus on some specific themes that 
help the researcher identify the important 
geopolitical assumptions which could form 
the U.S. geopolitical code in relation to 
the Persian Gulf oil and the Iraq War. The 
arguments and discussions stress the oil 
experience of the Bush administration, the 
oil shortage and the severe threat to the 
United States industry, the dependency on 
foreign oil, the Persian Gulf oil as the U.S. 
vital interests, influence of neoconservatives’ 
thoughts, the September 11 attacks, Iraq as a 
serious threat, pre-emptive war as a response 
to the threat, and oil control of the Persian 
Gulf as a necessity for the continuation of 
America’s hegemonic position.
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The Bush Administration and Oil Industry 
― Assumptions and Experiences 
Midland in the West Texas is a flat, dry 
and dusty place, which has been seen as 
the capital of the Permian Basin. It was 
the place where George W. Bush and his 
parents returned to in 1950. Despite the 
seemingly dreary landscape, a sea of oil 
swims beneath it. Notably, in 1950s, it 
comprised nearly 20 percent of America’s 
oil production. Following his father’s 
path to business and for other political 
reasons, Bush Jr. returned to Midland in 
1975. It coincided with the quadrupling 
of oil prices due to the Yom Kippur War1 
and the establishment of OPEC in 1973 
and 1974 (Zelizer, 2010). In Midland, he 
experienced an entry-level position in the 
oil industry and the funds raised via his 
family connections helped form his oil 
exploration company (Greenstein, 2003). 
He noted, “In 1979, I started a small energy 
exploration company in Midland. I raised 
money, mostly from the East Coast, to 
finance drilling in low-risk, low-return oil 
and gas wells” (Bush, G.W., 2010, p. 30). 
He also continued his oil company business 
instead of political activities; however, 
he was not as successful as his father, 
Bush Sr. Furthermore, it coincided with a 
recession in the oil industry around 1982. 
Subsequently, his oil company, Arbusto, 
was merged with Spectrum 7, which was 
a big oil exploration company in 1984 
(Marquez, 2007). Although he ultimately 
left the oil business in 1990, supporting the 
oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge became an important issue that he 
campaigned for in his 2000 presidential 
election campaign. He declared in his first 
presidential debate on October 3, 2000, that
“I was a small oil person for a 
while in west Texas... You bet I 
want to open up a small part of 
Alaska. When that field is online, it 
will produce one million barrels a 
day.” With reference to the import 
of one million barrels from Iraq, 
he commented, “I would rather 
that a million come from our own 
hemisphere, have it come from our 
own country as opposed to Saddam 
Hussein”.
(Bush, G.W., 2000) 
Later, when George W. Bush became 
the United States President and in response 
to the influence from domestic oil producers, 
he nominated some famous politicians for 
important positions in his administration. 
Dick Cheney was appointed as the Vice 
President in 1993 when President Clinton 
took the Office. Cheney was CEO of 
Halliburton Company, which is one of the 
biggest oil-services companies in the world 
to date. Prior to that, when Cheney was 
the Defense Secretary in the Bush Senior 
administration, Halliburton won a five-year 
contract to provide logistics for the United 
States Army, and it won defense contracts 
worth over $2.2 billion when Bush Jr. was 
inaugurated. Moreover, Cheney resigned 
from Halliburton Company in 2000 while 
he still received about $1 million annually 
from the company (Burman, 2007). Another 
The U.S. Geopolitical Code and the Role of the Persian Gulf Oil in the U.S. Military Intervention in 2003
103Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 22 (1): 95 - 118 (2014)
Bush Cabinet member, Donald Rumsfeld, 
who was the Defense Secretary, held 
different positions especially in the Reagan 
administration; the most important of them 
was related to his mission as Reagan’s 
Special Envoy to Iraq. There is a view that 
his aim was to increase Iraq’s oil exports 
through Jordan by using an oil pipeline, 
which could supply cheaper oil for the U.S. 
and Israel (Wogan, 2004). Furthermore, from 
this position, he managed to gain valuable 
experiences, particularly concerning Iraq 
and the Middle East oil. In this context, 
others to be considered were Donald Evens 
as the Commerce Secretary, who was the 
owner of Colorado Oil Company, Gen. 
Thomas White, the Secretary of the Army 
who was from Enron Energy, and Robert 
Jordan, the Saudi Arabia ambassador, who 
was a member of Baker Botts and active in 
oil and defense affairs (Pfeiffer, 2004).
The United States Oil Industry and the 
Severe Oil and Gas Shortage 
Indeed, although there is this view that the 
intention of toppling Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq had been formed at the beginning of the 
Bush administration in early 2001 (Clark, 
2005), at that time, however, preventing 
terrorism or controlling the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) after 
the September 11, 2001 attacks was not 
yet a top priority of Bush foreign policy. 
There was a severe oil and gas shortage, 
especially in some parts of the United 
States, which began months before Bush 
Jr. became the President (Klare, 2004b). 
At that time, the nation was suffering from 
increases in gasoline prices, shortage of 
natural gas in some regions, and rolling 
blackouts in California. This difficult 
situation continued until George W. Bush 
entered the White House in early 2001. In 
response to this crisis, the National Energy 
Policy Development Group (NEPDG) 
was created by the President, led by Vice 
President Dick Cheney. This group was 
appointed to analyze the difficult situation 
concerning America’s energy and plan 
suitable solutions for that problem (Klare, 
2004c). 
 The United States Oil Industry ― 
National Energy Policy and Increasing 
Dependency on Foreign Oil
According to the National Energy Policy 
(NEP) report, this body was established 
by the President in his second week in the 
office, an act which in the first instance 
reveals the significance of oil and natural 
gas to the Bush administration’s view. This 
report concludes that the United States 
faced the most serious crisis of energy 
shortages in 2001 – a situation which had 
its beginnings during the oil embargoes in 
the 1970s. The nation’s energy crisis was a 
result of a basic imbalance between supply 
and demand. This posits that even increasing 
levels of energy production at the same rate 
which occurred during the previous decade 
could not meet the increasing levels of 
consumption during this energy crisis. This 
imbalance could have undermined the U.S. 
economy, the Americans’ standard of living, 
as well as the U.S. national security. 
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On the other hand, estimates indicated 
that by 2020, the U.S. oil and natural gas 
consumption would increase by 33 and 
50 percent, respectively, and the existing 
growth rate for oil production would 
improve the gap between demand and 
supply. Statistically, following the report, the 
United States daily oil consumption would 
grow by over 6 million barrels between 2000 
and 2020. Moreover, according to previous 
growth patterns of production, it would face 
a decline of about 1.5 million barrels per 
day. It stressed that by 2020, only 30 percent 
of America’s oil needs would be supplied 
from the U.S. oil production, and thus, the 
U.S. would have to import nearly two out 
of every three barrels of oil (NEP, 2001)2. 
This document explicitly looks at 
other regions outside the U.S. territories 
which could supply America’s energy 
needs, although it considers five specific 
national goals as follows: “America must 
modernize conservation, modernize our 
energy infrastructure, increase energy 
supplies, accelerate the protection and 
improvement of the environment, and 
increase our nation’s energy security” (NEP, 
2001, p. ix). 
As Klare (2004c) correctly noted, 
instead of stressing conservation and the 
rapid expansion of renewable energy 
sources as the main challenges, the report 
reflects increasing U.S. dependence on 
oil, and because U.S. oil production 
was declining, any rise in the U.S. oil 
consumption would increase its dependence 
on imported petroleum. The report (NEP, 
2001) represents the importance of energy 
position in the Bush administration, and it 
explicitly refers to the U.S. dependence on 
oil as a serious long-term challenge, as well 
as stresses a close linkage between U.S. 
economic security and its trading partners, 
on the one hand, and the global oil market 
development, on the other (p. 1-11). 
The Persian Gulf Oil as the United 
States Vital Interests ― A Geopolitical 
Assumption
NEP refers to the role of the Middle East in 
terms of “where supply is geographically 
concentrated” in determining the oil price. 
In this respect, it declares that among 
those regions which supply the world oil, 
“Central and South America account for 9 
percent”, Africa and North America, 7 and 
5 percent, respectively, and Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, 5 percent. 
As stated in the report, the rest of Asia and 
Western Europe, account for 4 and 2 percent, 
respectively. 
Among all regions, the Middle East 
dominates almost “two-thirds of world 
proven reserves” and this explains how this 
region has a huge dominant impact over the 
price of oil, which is a vital matter for the 
U.S. and West (p. 1-12). Just consider what 
had been said in 1999 by Dick Cheney, when 
he was Chairman of Halliburton Company. 
He declared that, although there are many 
regions around the world that provide great 
oil opportunities, only the Middle East 
region “is still where the prize ultimately 
lies” and this is due to its huge reservoirs 
and its lowest cost (Cheney, 1999).
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In this respect, according to the United 
States Department of Energy, the Persian 
Gulf region supplied about 12.6 per cent 
of U.S. demands and about 23.8 percent of 
its oil imports in 2000. Moreover, about 21 
and 75 percent of West Europe and Japan, 
respectively, were also supplied via the 
Persian Gulf (EIA, 2002b). It is interesting 
to note that at that time, like the previous 
administrations3, the Persian Gulf region 
was identified as the U.S. vital interests. 
Hence, from this point of view, access to that 
region was one of the key considerations 
in the U.S. foreign policy at the time 
(O’Tuathail, 2003). 
The Bush administration in this report 
(NEP, 2001) stressed that by 2020, between 
54 and 67 percent of the world’s oil demands 
would be supplied by the oil producers in the 
Persian Gulf. Therefore, dependency of the 
global economy on the supply of oil from 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) members would also 
be increased. Consequently, “this region 
will remain vital to U.S. interests”. It also 
stressed that “the Gulf will be a primary 
focus of U.S. international energy policy” 
(pp. 8-4 & 8-5). 
Therefore, since the Second World 
War, as a principal element in defining the 
geopolitical code, the Persian Gulf region 
has repeatedly been positioned as the United 
States vital interests, and this has been a 
persistent geopolitical assumption among 
the U.S. political leaders. Along with some 
other different factors, the issue of energy 
security with focus on the energy resources 
of the Persian Gulf has obviously been the 
most significant element determining this 
area as a vital interest, which prescribes 
the United States military presence in the 
Persian Gulf. 
Apparent ly,  this  was explici t ly 
emphasized by President Carter, known 
as the Carter Doctrine. According to Klare 
(2006), the doctrine has been continued 
through to the Bush administration so that 
any threat to these interests will always be 
answered by military action. However, to 
define geopolitical codes, it is necessary to 
specify and define the potential threats to 
America’s interests, the adequate response 
to threats and the justification to choose that 
response (Flint & Taylor, 2007). The Bush 
administration also required an adequate 
opportunity to act, which was, of course, 
provided by the September 11 attacks in 
2001. 
The Neoconservatives and Redefining the 
United States Geopolitical Code
As O’Loughlin noted, it was a reality 
that although the United States desired 
to reorder the geopolitical condition of 
the post-Cold War world, it had not yet 
consistently accepted a certain geopolitical 
code (O’Loughlin, 2000). It was an attempt 
to redefine its geopolitical code with 
regard to keeping its position as the sole 
remaining superpower from the Cold War 
era, and reordering the new geopolitical 
world order. It started with the geopolitical 
transition period immediately after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the policy 
was pursued even more actively with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The 
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most remarkable attempt to redefine a new 
geopolitical code was between 1991 and 
2000 with Bush Senior’s pronouncement 
of the New World Order. The 1991 Gulf 
War was based on this idea to construct a 
new geopolitical world order, but was not 
pursued by the Clinton Administration (Flint 
et al., 2009). 
In 1993, not long after Bill Clinton 
became the President, the neoconservatives 
began a number of censures against his 
administration. Within this period, two 
geopolitical discourses emerged as variants 
of neo-conservatism and became influential 
visions of twenty-first century geopolitics. 
One of them was Samuel P. Huntington’s 
‘Clash of Civilization,’ which portrayed ‘the 
West’ against ‘the Rest’ so that others would 
try to challenge the West’s primacy. A new 
cross-civilizational concept was introduced, 
namely, the ‘Confucian-Islamic connection’ 
that would be a network of ‘weapon states’ 
and provide a dangerous ‘otherness’ to ‘the 
West’. That new enemy would threaten 
the ‘Western interests, values and power’. 
Huntington, as a neoconservative, extended 
a vision of a ‘culture war’ between ‘the 
West’ and the ‘Otherness’, which was a 
‘standard neoconservative preconception’. 
In addition, the second neoconservative 
geopolitical discourse related to the 
‘Statement of Principles’ announced by a 
group called Project for a New American 
Century (PNAC). Reasserting the American 
supremacy in world affairs was the main 
goal of PNAC, on which basis the United 
States would become sufficiently strong 
and would need greater levels of defense 
spending (O’Tuathail, 2006, pp. 120-123). 
Later, especially after the September 11 
attacks, both these geopolitical discourses 
influenced the U.S. action. The Middle 
East remarkably became the geographical 
context to practice these discourses. Al 
Qaeda, a terrorist group which had its roots 
in Saudi Arabia, designed an unprecedented 
attack on the West’s world symbols while 
claiming its purpose was to protect the 
Muslim world’s interests against the West 
(Bin Laden, 2002). 
It is also important to note the particular 
importance of PNAC to the Middle East 
region, where the ‘Statement of Principles’ 
emphasized the vital role of the U.S. in 
maintaining peace and security in the 
Middle East. Furthermore, history has also 
shown that along with the survival of 
Israel, energy resources of the Persian 
Gulf had always been America’s most 
vital interest in the Middle East. More 
interesting is that, PNAC was organized 
by neoconservatives, some of whom were 
nominated by Bush Jr. in his administration, 
namely, Dick Cheney (Vice President), 
Donald Rumsfeld (Defense Secretary), Paul 
Wolfowitz (Rumsfeld deputy), as well as Jeb 
Bush and Lewis Libby (Cheney’s Chiefs 
of Staff). Conservative views were clearly 
demonstrated, especially after September 
11, in the framework of the National 
Security Strategy document (NSS-2002), 
as well as in decisions made concerning the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
It is noticeable also that overthrowing 
Saddam Hussein was one of the greatest 
causes of neoconservatives in the late 1990s 
(O’Tuathail, 2006). It was on January 26, 
1998, when some neoconservatives, such 
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as Elliot Abrams, Francis Fukuyama, 
Robert Kagan, Paul Wolfowitz and Donald 
Rumsfeld, wrote a letter to President Clinton, 
urging the United States administration 
to act decisively (Abrams et al., 1998). 
As noted by O’Tuathail (2006), after the 
September 11 attacks, the worldview of 
neoconservatives was not only changed but 
also strengthened, in which they applied 
more aggressive policies to pursue their 
agenda. It started with the “preparations 
for the public relations campaign to justify 
the invasion of Iraq.” In this respect, 
“the campaign was launched with the 
publication of new National Security 
strategy in September 2002” (O’Tuathail, 
2006, p. 127). 
Before that, on September 20, 2001, 
a letter was written to George W. Bush 
through PNAC and signed by some neocons, 
supporting the necessary military action 
in Afghanistan to remove Saddam from 
power. The signatories to this letter, namely, 
William Kristol, Jeffrey Bergner, Francis 
Fukuyama and Geoffrey Bell, emphasized 
that, “even if evidence does not link Iraq 
directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at 
the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors 
must include a determined effort to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power” (PNAC, 
2001). It clearly demonstrated removing 
Saddam from power as a previously 
determined project as well as influencing 
the neoconservative assumptions about the 
Bush administration, especially about Iraq.
The United States Geopolitical Code and 
the 11/9 Attacks ― A Unique Opportunity
The September 11 terrorist attacks, 2001, 
indeed provided an opportunity for the 
Bush administration to reconstruct the 
United States geopolitical code, and based 
on these unprecedented events, the ‘War on 
Terrorism’ introduced what scholars knew 
as a geopolitical code. It had its roots in the 
NSS-2000, which was the foundation of 
the “Bush Doctrine. In addition, NSS was 
actually an annual exercise that updated 
the U.S. geopolitical code (Flint, 2006). 
Obviously, the immediate U.S. response 
to the September 11 attacks was ‘War in 
Afghanistan’. It took place on October 7, 
2001, against the terrorist training camps 
of al Qaeda and the military camps of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan (G. W. Bush, 
2001), and effectively introduced the Bush 
Doctrine and War on Terrorism. 
According to NSS, what became 
known as the Bush Doctrine, the identified 
geopolitical threat “contained an apparent 
vagueness, but was able to become fixed 
on particular countries quite easily” (Flint, 
2006, p. 72). This document emphasized 
that, “the United States of America is 
fighting a war against global reach.” Based 
on this document, the enemy was not a 
person or a political regime; it was also 
not a religion or ideology, but the enemy 
was “terrorism” (NSS, 2002, p. 5). Placing 
terrorism in a global context enabled 
activity at different times and in specific 
geographical regions. It was indeed seen as a 
combination of different paradigms, namely, 
‘noblesse oblige’ and ‘eagle triumphant’ 
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paradigms, which were the results of 
Global War on terror rhetoric. This helped 
to form a militaristic foreign policy for 
democratization and development, on 
the one hand, and a ‘world of regions’ 
paradigm, on the other, for the U.S. response 
and responsibility against terrorists in 
specific geographical regions. From this 
view, the U.S. code was grounded with an 
emphasis on specific countries, although the 
agenda was global (Flint et al., 2009). This 
kind of orientation in Bush’s geopolitical 
assumptions had portrayed an “axis of 
evil” with an emphasis on specific regions, 
which included Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. 
President Bush declared in his state of the 
union address in 2002 that, “states like these 
and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of 
evil.” For him, “these regimes pose a grave 
and growing danger” ( Bush, G. W., 2002). 
R e g a r d i n g  t h e s e  g e o p o l i t i c a l 
assumptions, terrorism, state supporters of 
terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction 
were identified as threats, which were 
elements of America’s geopolitical code. 
Moreover, the pre-emptive strike was 
identified as a response to an identified 
threat in some specific countries, which 
was clearly aimed against Iraq. Based on 
this view, justifications were provided 
for these decisions and actions, some 
of which were considered opposites of 
freedom, global order of prosperity and 
civilization (Flint, 2006). According to the 
Bush administration, Iraq was a regime that 
had already used “poison gas to murder 
thousands of its own citizens - leaving the 
bodies of mothers huddled over their dead 
children” and it was “a regime that had 
something to hide from the civilized world” 
(G. W. Bush, 2002). What is important is 
that, all the three countries, namely, North 
Korea, Iran and Iraq, were accused of 
proliferating WMD and were considered 
the opposites of freedom and civilization. 
However, among the three mentioned 
countries, why only Iraq was selected for 
invasion, while even, according to Bahgat 
(2003), “fifteen out of the nineteen 9/11 
hijackers carried Saudi passports”(p. 448). 
Iraq ― A Threat to Interests
The importance of energy resources in the 
Persian Gulf region has been discussed 
above, not least as it ensures the free flow 
of oil towards the industrial world as vital 
interests for the United States of America. 
In this respect, however, what was the role 
of Iraq among these interests?
Firstly, at that time, Iraq, with about 
112 billion barrels of oil, possessed the 
second largest proven crude oil reserves in 
the world. It contained about 11 percent of 
the global total, while, according to a report 
of the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) 2003, only 17 out of 80 oil fields 
had been developed, which concentrated 
around Kirkuk in the north and Rumaila 
in the south of Iraq. This country also had 
significant proven natural gas reserves, in 
which almost all were undeveloped (CRS, 
2003). At that time, Iraq contained about 
110 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural 
gas or about 20 percent of the world total 
(EIA, 2002a). Furthermore, according to 
the annual report of the Organization of the 
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Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 
2001, among the Middle Eastern producers, 
Iraq possessed the second largest proven 
oil reserves after Saudi Arabia. It covered 
more than 16 percent of the total Middle 
East proven oil reserves. Based on this 
report, the proven natural gas in Iraq also 
contained more than 4 percent of the Middle 
East total natural gas reserves in 2001 
(OPEC, 2001). In the same year, oil exports 
from Iraq were about 2 million barrels per 
day, representing 12 percent of total oil 
exportation from the Persian Gulf, making 
Iraq the third oil exporter after Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, and also equal with Kuwait (EIA, 
2002b). More importantly, there is the view 
that Iraq was capable to explore and exploit 
many additional oil fields due to its vast oil 
reservoirs; therefore, it had the capability to 
become an oil producer on a par with Saudi 
Arabia in the future. For this reason, it was 
called the second Saudi Arabia (Morse, 
2004).
Secondly, it became more important 
when Iraq was considered along with 
the two other important Middle Eastern 
oil producers, namely, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. In 2001, Saudi Arabia, as the 
world’s largest oil exporter, held the leading 
position in the world’s proven oil reserves 
with more than 25 per cent of the total and 
about 3.5 percent of global proven natural 
gas reserves (OPEC, 2001). It also produced 
about 44 percent of total Persian Gulf oil 
output (EIA, 2002b), and was the most 
important oil supplier to the United States 
after Canada in 2000, accounting for some 
14 percent of U.S. total oil imports (NEP, 
2001). 
In this respect, Kuwait possessed about 
10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves 
and about 0.8 percent of the world’s proven 
natural gas (OPEC, 2001). On the other 
hand, Saddam Hussein, however, had 
proven that he was a potential threat for 
two of Iraq’s neighboring countries, namely, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. They were two 
regional friends of the U.S. and it was vital 
to the U.S. interests in the region to secure 
their stability. The invasion of Kuwait in 
1990 and the greed of Saddam4 for oil fields 
of the Persian Gulf countries, especially 
Kuwait, as an old desire had made him a 
certain threat to the Persian Gulf region and 
the flow of oil to the West. In President Bush 
Jr.’s statement during his speech in a Union 
address in January 2003, he clearly declared:
“Our Nation and the world must 
learn the lessons of the Korean 
Peninsula and not allow an even 
greater threat to rise up in Iraq. 
A brutal dictator, with a history 
of reckless aggression, with ties 
to terrorism, with great potential 
wealth, will not be permitted to 
dominate a vital region and threaten 
the United States”
(G. W. Bush, 2003b). 
Despite the lack of direct reference 
to oil in most of his important speeches 
concerning Iraq and terrorism, Bush 
introduced directly and explicitly Saddam’s 
government as a threat in the Union address, 
and deliberately alleged that Saddam was a 
threat greater than North Korea. For him, 
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Saddam was a dictator, and thus, posed 
a potential threat to other countries, in 
particular, the Iraq’s neighboring states. In 
this respect, “precluding hostile domination 
of critical areas” such as “the Middle 
East and Southwest Asia” had also been 
considered as one of the objectives of the 
United States Armed Forces, as mentioned 
in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
of the United States Department of Defense 
(QDRR, 2001) . 
Bush Jr. also explicitly referred to Iraqi 
oil as a great potential wealth. This was 
similar to the previous U.S. presidents, 
especially after the Second World War, in 
which he emphasized the Persian Gulf as 
a vital region for the United States. Based 
on his view, Saddam’s domination over this 
region would translate as a peril to the U.S. 
vital interests, and thus, threaten the U.S. 
national security. Dick Cheney also stated 
clearly in his statement as Vice President 
in the Bush administration on August 25, 
2002, “The whole range of weapons of 
mass destruction then would rest in the 
hands of a dictator... Armed with an arsenal 
of these weapons of terror and seat at a 
top ten percent of the world’s oil reserves, 
Saddam Hussein could then be expected to 
seek domination of the entire Middle East, 
take control of great portion of the world’s 
energy supplies directly threaten America’s 
friends throughout the region and subject 
the United States or any other nation to 
nuclear blackmail” (Cheney, 2002). Indeed, 
Saddam could not be a threat to the U.S. 
interests or to the status quo in the region if 
Iraq did not have the central geographical 
situation among the world’s oil supplies 
(Morse, 2004). The threat could be supposed 
when Saddam was potentially capable of 
threatening the U.S. allies, especially Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. 
It was apparent that by dominating 
Iraq, Saddam would threaten three key 
oil producers and reserves in the world, 
countries which were exporting about 68 
percent of the Persian Gulf oil exports. 
These were three oil countries with common 
borders, and because Iraq had always faced 
geopolitical limitation to access the high 
seas through the Persian Gulf, there was 
always the possibility of Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (and even Iran, 
given what happened from 1980 to 1988). 
Therefore, Iraq could be a serious potential 
threat to the United States and on the basis 
of the Bush Doctrine and neoconservative 
thought, Iraq as a ‘rogue state’ required an 
adequate response, which was defined as the 
‘pre-emptive attack’. 
The Pre-emptive Action ― A Response 
to Threat
Bush already announced in his state of the 
Union address in 2002 that, “all nations 
should know: America will do what is 
necessary to ensure our Nation’s security...I 
will not wait on events while dangers 
gather. I will not stand by as peril draws 
closer and closer” (G. W. Bush, 2002). 
This geopolitical assumption was also 
reflected in the National Security Strategy 
(NSS) through the framework of pre-
emptive action. This document stressed 
the U.S. “right of self-defense by acting 
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pre-emptively” (NSS, 2002, p. 6). It simply 
emphasized striking before America’s 
enemies strike first (Flint, 2006). At that 
time, although the Containment policy that 
was the U.S. geopolitical code during the 
Cold War era had been changed to War on 
Terrorism, in both times, using military force 
to protect U.S. vital interests was considered 
as adequate response. In this regard, just 
as the Carter Doctrine determined military 
action in response to the Soviet expansion 
towards the Persian Gulf, the Bush Doctrine 
selected Iraq as a rogue state and pre-
emptive action was prescribed as a response 
to prevent domination of a dictator over the 
oil fields in the Persian Gulf. 
As a result and apart from different 
representations of the U.S. geopolitical 
code, such as spreading freedom and 
democracy as values to justify war against 
Iraq, war as a response to protect a vital 
interest in the Persian Gulf region could be 
considered a fact. As Flint (2006) noted, 
“if the calculations for war can be traced 
to material interest, such as access to oil, 
governments must emphasize values or 
ideas in justifying their foreign policy, 
especially when it involves invading a 
country rather than defending one’s own” 
(p. 101). This geopolitical fact of protecting 
the Persian Gulf energy resources as the U.S. 
vital interest along with other geopolitical 
reasons such as the Greater Middle East 
Project (Guney & Gokcan, 2010; Naji, 
2004) was what could be existed behind 
the U.S. foreign policy or using military 
action against Iraq. This policy was justified 
through justifications such as promotion of 
democracy and protection of freedom as the 
U.S. values. From this viewpoint, it was a 
‘resource war’ – a war for natural resources 
which has always been a critical motive (Le 
Billon, 2004), whether because of acquiring 
important raw materials for domestic 
needs, or for controlling vital resources in 
a competitive world environment. In fact, 
accessing global resources, in particular 
oil, has always been seen as a battleground. 
Apparently, the twenty-first century will 
be the same as the twentieth century and 
one that appears to be the century of oil too 
(O’Loughlin & Wusten, 1993).
Tracing the reasons for al Qaeda’s 
September 11 attacks, it is also important 
to note that Osama bin Laden in his ‘Letter 
to America’ noted, “You steal our wealth 
and oil at paltry prices... This theft is 
indeed the biggest theft ever witnessed by 
mankind in the history of the world” (Bin 
Laden, 2002). On the other side and one 
year later, protecting this ‘wealth’ was also 
stressed by President Bush to justify the war 
against Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003 (G. 
W. Bush, 2003b). Therefore, there was a 
strong linkage between the U.S. geopolitical 
code and the Persian Gulf oil as America’s 
vital interests, such that along with other 
security reasons, this could influence the 
U.S. leader’s geopolitical assumptions in 
determining the U.S. geopolitical code, 
and ultimately the orientation of U.S. 
foreign policy toward the invasion of Iraq. 
Needless to say, this was the reason Iraq was 
selected for invasion, as clearly evident in 
the statement by the Deputy of U.S. Defense 
Department, Wolfowitz on May 31, 2003, 
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“Look, the primary difference – to put it a 
little too simply - between North Korea and 
Iraq is that we had virtually no economic 
options with Iraq because the country floats 
on a sea of oil”6 (Wolfowitz, 2003).
Oil Control for Hegemonic Goals
With reference to the offensive realism 
theoretical approach, the invasion of 
America in Iraq in 2003 and consequently 
its military presence in the Persian Gulf 
could be interpreted as America’s attempts 
to prevent emerging regional hegemons 
and promote its own hegemonic position 
in the world. From the perspective of 
geopolitics of oil in the world, this can be 
seen as a strategic decision to control the 
largest basin of oil in the world. Thus, this 
is also a means of controlling other great 
powers, in particular those states which are 
potential regional hegemonic states such 
as China. This perspective is reminiscent 
of “the global oil spigot” for gaining an 
efficient rule over the global economy 
(Harvey, 2003) and exerting leverage over 
industrial rivals (Mercille, 2010). Indeed, 
it stresses that the control of oil has always 
been defined as “the centre of gravity of 
U.S. economic hegemony” (Bromley, 2006). 
America’s desire to continue in its 
highest position, which had remained from 
the Cold War era, was clearly seen in Bush’s 
speeches and the NSS-2002. However, it had 
been stated as a necessary step to protect 
the American values as well as promoting 
these values across the world. Expansion of 
freedom, democracy and peace throughout 
the countries especially amongst, as Bush 
said, the uncivilized world had been defined 
as a significant mission and responsibility 
for the United States. Bush further said that, 
“America is a nation with a mission, and 
that mission comes from our [American] 
most basic beliefs” (G. W Bush, 2004). In 
this respect, the National Security Strategy 
of the U.S. stressed freedom as “the non-
negotiable demand of human dignity,” 
that the U.S. assumed the responsibility of 
leading the expansion of it and its benefits 
across the world as a great mission (NSS, 
2002). 
From this perspective, invading Iraq 
was also to promote democracy as the 
American value in Iraq and the Middle 
East. For Bush, a free Iraq in the Middle 
East would mean “a watershed event in the 
global democratic revolution,” and indeed, 
Iraq could be regarded as “a model for the 
broader Middle East” ( Bush, G. W., 2003a; 
2003; 2004a). Simultaneously, terrorism 
was defined as a threat to the American 
values and the civilized world, which was 
under the leadership of the United States. In 
this respect, all countries which supported 
terrorism would be considered as a threat 
as well. These threats were specified as the 
‘axis of evil’ (G. W. Bush, 2002), the ‘rogue 
states’(NSS, 2002), the ‘outlaw regimes’ 
(G. W. Bush, 2003b), and the ‘dangerous 
regimes’ ( Bush, G. W., 2004b). Iraq was 
also defined as a state that was trying to 
proliferate weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and was allegedly a supporter of 
terrorist groups. 
These justifications facilitated the U.S. 
action against Iraq as well as its military 
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presence in the Persian Gulf region. In this 
respect, two significant objectives could be 
reached through the Iraq War, which were 
in conformity with the U.S. geopolitical 
code: first, a regime change that was done 
to remove a regional threat to the U.S. rich 
oil friendly countries such as Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, and second, by using these 
justifications, the United States would be 
able to continue its military presence in this 
area and consequently control the largest 
oil reservoir in the world. By controlling 
this region, the U.S. would control the 
oil flows to the industrial countries, and 
thus, control the global economy. Finally, 
it could be resulted in controlling other 
potential regional hegemonic states as 
well as preventing the emergence of new 
regional hegemons while promoting its own 
hegemonic position globally. 
CONCLUSION
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, the U.S. leaders found an opportunity 
to redefine the U.S. geopolitical code 
as a Global War on Terror. This global 
geopolitical code relied on those geopolitical 
assumptions that would pursue the U.S. 
global hegemony in particular after the Cold 
War geopolitical order. With regard to this 
geopolitical code and through observing 
the U.S. foreign policy toward the Persian 
Gulf, in particular the Iraq War 2003, this 
research suggests two important issues. 
First, the importance of the Persian Gulf 
oil as a vital interest for the U.S. and the 
removal of Saddam from his power were 
two imperative geopolitical assumptions 
that influenced the Bush administration. 
Second, amongst the three states 
claimed as the ‘axis of evil’ by Bush, Iraq 
was selected as the target for the U.S. pre-
emptive war. It was done because Iraq 
possessed a huge extendable amount of oil 
reserves and its oil was necessary for the 
industrial world. In addition, history had 
also shown that the Iraqi government could 
be a potential threat to neighboring states, in 
particular Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which 
were regional allies of the United States. 
More importantly, the Iraqi oil, along with 
that from the two mentioned countries, 
constituted about 68% of the Persian Gulf 
total exports. Hence, from this view, Iraq 
could threaten significant amounts of 
the Persian Gulf oil exports. In the Bush 
Doctrine, Iraq was introduced as a threat, 
and thus, the pre-emptive action was defined 
as a response with the expansion of freedom 
and democracy being the justifications for 
the action. From this perspective, therefore, 
it formed a strong link between protecting 
the Persian Gulf oil as a crucial element 
for the U.S. national security and defining 
the Iraqi government as a certain threat 
to oil fields of the region and a supporter 
of terrorism as well. Finally, the Bush 
Doctrine and Bush’s speeches emphasized 
the importance of expanding the American 
values and defending them across the world 
as a global mission for the United States. It 
was a justification for going to war abroad 
such as in Iraq. 
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Furthermore, it was considered as a 
global responsibility to prevent terrorist 
attacks on the civilized world and to promote 
democracy in the Middle East. However, it 
clearly revealed the U.S. attempt to keep 
and promote its own hegemonic position, 
as well as deter other great powers from 
becoming regional hegemonic states, and 
this conforms to the tenets of the offensive 
realism theory. Tracing the Bush Doctrine 
and his presidential speeches, there was 
clearly a strong linkage between preserving 
the U.S. hegemonic position and promoting 
the American values around the world. In 
this respect, to preserve its hegemony, the 
U.S. had to continue its global presence and 
protect its values. Obviously, adopting the 
U.S. culture and ideology by other states 
would reinforce U.S. hegemonic position 
and consequently prevent the emergence of 
other potential regional hegemonic powers. 
In addition, the U.S. military intervention 
in Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein 
from power would stop Iraqi hegemonic 
ambitions. As Bush (2003b) and Cheney 
(2002) noted, this would prevent the Iraqi 
regime from dominating the entire Middle 
East.
ENDNOTES
1 The Yom Kippur War which took place 
between October 6 and October 25, 1973, was 
fought between Israel and a coalition of some 
Arab countries, led by Egypt and Syria. It began 
when forces of the coalition crossed ceasefire 
lines and entered the Sinai Desert and Golan 
Heights, which had been occupied by Israel 
since the Six-Day War in 1967. This conflict 
also created serious tensions between the two 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and led to a near-confrontation between 
them. That war was also called the Ramadan 
War, or the Fourth Arab-Israel War. For more 
information see (Dunstan, 2007).
2 In this respect, the U.S. Department of Energy 
in ‘International Energy Outlook 2002’ with 
reference to the United States as the largest 
consumer of oil in the world, for more than one-
quarter of total world demand had predicted 
that the primary consumption of oil in America 
would increase by 1.5 percent annually from 
1999 to 2020. Moreover, that oil share in the 
U.S. energy mix would increase slightly from 
39.4 percent in 1999 to 39.7 percent in 2020, 
totaling 26.7 million barrels per day (EIA, 
2002a).
3 All administrations from President Truman 
to President Clinton, as well as documents 
such as ‘A National Security Strategy for A 
New Century - 1998’ and ‘A National Security 
Strategy for A New Century - 1999’ and ‘A 
National Security Strategy for A Global Age 
- 2000’, which had been projected before the 
beginning of Bush’s presidency emphasized the 
importance of the Persian Gulf region for the 
United States to ensure the security of oil flow 
toward the U.S. and its allies, namely, West 
Europe and Japan. For more information, see 
(NSS, 1998, 1999, 2000).
4 From Saddam’s view, Kuwait was part of 
the Ottoman province, which was under the 
authority of Basra, and thus, Kuwait belonged 
to Iraq. However, Saddam’s main concern 
was oil, and from his view, Kuwait owed Iraq 
because Iraq had fought against Iran for all the 
Arabs. He also claimed that Kuwait’s oil must 
be used for all the Arabs. For more information, 
see (Long, 2004) and (Flint, 2006).
5 Saddam had been introduced as a threat to the 
security, peace and oil fields of the region as 
mentioned through Bush Senior in his state of 
the Union address on January 29, 1991 (G. H. 
W. Bush, 1991) and Clinton’s speech in 1988 
(G. W. Bush, 2010, p. 227).
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6 This statement from Wolfowitz has been 
noted in different sources with minor changes. 
These sources cite that, “the most important 
difference between North Korea and Iraq is that 
economically, we just had no choice in Iraq. 
The country swims on a sea of oil.” See, for 
instance,(Le Billon, 2004) and (Wright, 2003).
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